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When Self-Preservation Bids: 
Approaching Milton, Hobbes, and Dissent
 
Critics have long used the heuristic device of opposing John Milton and Thomas Hobbes, but this essay explores surprising affinities between the two. After observing that Milton and other Restoration dissenters often agreed with Hobbes on questions of ecclesiastic jurisdiction and toleration nearly as much as they disagreed with what seemed at times like Hobbes’ unswerving de facto
 
-ism, the essay shows howMil on and other dissent rs found in Hobbes’ Leviathan
 
 an alluring theory f political obliga ion that, under c rtain c rcumsta ces, offer d much-s ught-after rights against the persecuting st ti  stat . Emphasizing the epistemological sti s brought to the fore by Hobbes’ distinct focus on self-preservation, the essay reads Milton’s
 
Samson Agonistes as a partial and complicated rec ption of Hobbes’thought. In adopting, a d at the same tim  rewriting, elements of 
 
Leviathan’s amous state of na ure, 
 
S mson Agoni tes, it s argued, marks an i portant moment in t e history of political theory and a s g ific nt moment for the d velopment of modern popular sovere gnty.
F
 
ollowing John Aubrey, the story usually told of John Milton and
Thomas Hobbes is that they were “diametrically opposite” on the




 If one thought one thing, the other would have been
opposed, and it falls to contemporary scholars to say how and why.
Milton was a pious republican and an advocate for free speech and
religious toleration. Hobbes therefore must have been all that Milton
was not: an atheist, an absolutist, and a conformist. From Marjorie
H. Nicolson in 1926 to Catherine Gimelli Martin in 1999, the contrasts
have been drawn vividly and have even yielded some remarkably insightful
scholarship: with Aubrey’s evaluation inevitably buttressing the argument,




Yet unremarked upon in such studies is the fact that at some point, Aubrey,




 over many years, decided such language was
too categorical, and so replaced the symbol editors have taken to mean
“diametrically opposite” with something softer: “Their Interests and
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 Although Merritt Y. Hughes,
for unknown reasons, prints in his much used Milton edition of 1957
“diametrically opposite,” all Aubrey editors since at least 1898 have




 What provoked Aubrey’s change?
Thinking about answers provides an opportunity to wonder if the
heuristic device of divining one man’s position from the other’s may
sometimes obscure what it seeks to clarify. Consider what happens, for
example, when we reconfigure the usual categories to ask what each
thought about the role of priests in civil affairs: Milton and Hobbes have
unexpectedly similar positions, each finding the episcopacy corrosive




 “It does not
require much foreshortening of historical explanation,” Mark Goldie has




Or consider that Oxford University burned their books together at the




 Previous studies have paid
insufficient attention to the reasons why their books were put to a
common flame.
Addressing these questions requires a reconsideration of both Milton
and Hobbes. I want to re-evaluate the story usually told of Hobbes
and Milton, attending to one area particularly: religious toleration. I will
examine the period from the mid-1660’s to the early 1670’s in order to




especially, the divisions usually drawn between Hobbes and Milton
are far too stark. I do not wish to claim that Milton and Hobbes were
friendly or partial to one another (they were not), but instead that,
as Aubrey at some point recognized, their interests overlapped during
the Restoration and that, when pressed by circumstances, they were not
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against the English people—to find tolerable or even admirable qualities




 Rather than uncritically projecting
Civil War divisions onto the Restoration, I hope to tell a story that
involves, for complicated reasons, the surprisingly welcome reception
Hobbes’s notion of self-preservation found among dissenters in the










 offers a potent example of the important modifications to notions
of sovereignty and subjectivity underway in the 1660’s and 1670’s as a




To begin with, I hope to paint a diptych with a central vanishing
point, portraying, on the one hand, “a more tolerant Hobbes” and, on




 In order to complicate the
persistent impression of Hobbes as an absolutist, I will highlight some
scholarship on Hobbes’s activities in the 1660’s that has yet to be inte-
grated into Milton studies, and I will bring to view some evidence of his





argument for sovereign authority over religious questions and some-
times because of it, a number of religious and political dissenters were
attracted to and employed Hobbes’s claims—particularly those radical
elements for which Hobbes was considered dangerous by the Restoration





into consideration the Restoration’s shifting alliances and dissenters’
tenuous relationship with particular facets of Hobbes’s thought. My
conclusion will suggest that in its confrontation with, consideration of,









It is not the case that Hobbes, as a good monarchist, reveled in the
Restoration of Charles II. Richard Tuck is right to describe the Restoration
as an “ambiguous event” for Hobbes, not the “unmixt blessing” for




Complete Prose Works of John Milton
 
, ed. Don M. Wolfe, 8 vols. (New Haven, 1953–1980), V, 451.




 during the Restoration.
10. The felicitous phrase belongs to Ryan. See Alan Ryan, “A More Tolerant Hobbes?,”
 
Justifying Toleration: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives
 






© 2007 English Literary Renaissance Inc.
 




 Among many problems with that
account, at least two should give us significant pause: the first is the
evidence of Hobbes’s connection with Interregnum Oxford, especially





second is that Hobbes was still at loggerheads with royalist Presbyterians
and Anglicans, most notably Clarendon, the man who had opposed




 in 1651, having
bragged that he had “had . . . some hand in the discountenancing” of
Hobbes that precipitated Hobbes’s departure from Charles II’s court in




 Such was the weariness with which the Restoration








 in Amsterdam because the




In fact, there is considerable reason to think, as Hobbes did, that more
than just his books were in danger. Twice in the 1660’s, Parliament
proposed to charge Hobbes with heresy, which occasioned Hobbes
to churn out eight works in four years, a prodigious output for anyone,




 Among those eight works
composed between 1666 and 1670 was a work denying Parliament’s
authority over matters of belief, 
 
Historical Narration Concerning Heresy,
and the Punishment thereof
 
, which Hobbes proposed (unsuccessfully) to
publish in 1668 to defend himself against Parliament’s actions against
him. But his self-preservationist polemic, while an important part of the
story (and one to which I will return), is only a part, for as Tuck also
points out, the proposals to try Hobbes for heresy and atheism came
within a larger milieu of Parliamentary debate on measures for dealing









 in 1673. The follow-
ing context indeed may be familiar to Milton critics, but historians
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importance to Hobbes. When Parliament was debating whether and how




 was entered into the Stationers’ Register—August 20th,
1667—Hobbes found himself aligned with Independents in wishing that





came up in Parliament (which in these years was all too often), so appar-








 With one group,
composed mostly of Anglicans, talking of strengthening the lapsed
Conventicles Act, and another group of moderate Anglicans and some
Presbyterians calling for limited religious “comprehension,” Hobbes’s
interests lay with the Independents, who saw little call for enforcement
of religious belief. In the summer of 1668, Parliament was adjourned.
On May 4, just before adjournment, the Commons had passed and sent









to Lord Arlington’s under-secretary on June 9, and then on June 30,
knowing the Lords would convene on August 11, he urgently requested








, Hobbes notes with barely restrained discontent how Charles
had “restored the bishops, and pardoned the Presbyterians,” and




 This position made sense
for a man fearing persecution, yet it also accorded with his persistent
campaign against Anglican and Presbyterian prelacy and, surprisingly,
even previous pleas for toleration.
 
16. That Paradise Lost was entered into the Stationers’ Register in August despite its having
been contracted since April suggests that the lapsing of the Conventicles Act may have been
the reason for registry on this date. For the date of the lapsing, see Tuck, p. 337. For a good
recent discussion of the publication of the first edition of Paradise Lost, which does not, however,
note the importance of the lapsing of the Conventicles Act, see Hugh Wilson, “The Publication
of Paradise Lost, the Occasion of the First Edition: Censorship and Resistance,” Milton Studies 37
(1999).
17. On October 16 and 17, 1666, for example, a House of Commons committee that requested
Leviathan be scrutinized linked it to improper “observation of the Lord’s day.” Parliament, Journals of
the House of Commons (1803), VIII, 636.
18. As it turned out, Parliament would not meet again for nine more months, allowing
dissenters relative freedom even after Parliament returned in October 1669 and until the Lords’
passed the bill in 1670.
19. For his letters to Joseph Williamson, Lord Arlington’s under-secretary, see Hobbes,
Correspondence, II, 692, 699.
20. Thomas Hobbes, The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, ed. William Molesworth,
11 vols. (1839), IV, 407–08.
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It may seem ironic that Hobbes became one of uniformity’s targets
since it is often claimed that religious uniformity was one of Leviathan’s
central desires. The inferences are drawn easily enough from comparisons
that Restoration opponents made between Hobbes and the Anglican
clergyman Samuel Parker, Gilbert Sheldon’s chaplain, whose vitupera-
tive conformist tract Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity drew a firestorm of
criticism from latitudinarians and nonconformists for its argument that
“it was necessary there should be one supreme and public judgment to
whose determination the private judgment of every single person should
be obliged to submit himself.”21 A careful look at Leviathan, however, shows
an argument with different emphases. Hobbes is less intent to demand a
sovereign determination on religious matters than he is to emphasize
that the authority to do so belongs to the sovereign, not to presbyters or
bishops. A sovereign could rule and punish on matters of religion, but
Hobbes presses this to show that priests could not.22 Before presbyters,
bishops, and popes came along to tie “knot[s] upon [believers’] liberty,”
according to Hobbes, peoples’ “Consciences were free, and their Words
and Actions subject to none but the Civill Power.”23 Consequently, the
admirable state that dissolves “the praeterpoliticall Church Government”
is one in which
We are reduced to the Independency of the Primative Christians to follow
Paul, or Cephas, or Apollos, every man as he liketh best: Which, if it be
without contention, and without measuring the Doctrine of Christ, by
our affection to the Person of his Minister, (the fault which the Apostle
reprehended in the Corinthians,) is perhaps the best: First because there
ought to be no Power over the Consciences of men, but of the Word it
selfe, working Faith in every one, not always according to the purpose of
them that Plant and Water, but of God himself, that giveth the Increase;
and secondly, because it is unreasonable in them, who teach there is such
danger in every little Errour, to require of a man endued with Reason
21. Samuel Parker, Discourse of Ecclesiastical Polity (1669), pp. 28–29. On dissenters’ responses
linking Parker and Hobbes, see Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary Politics and Locke’s Two Treatises
of Government (Princeton, 1986), pp. 39–74.
22. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (Harmondsworth, 1968), pp. 521–
608. On sovereign authority over matters of belief, it is important to distinguish between “could”
and “should.” For a discussion of the problems of deducing “ought” from “is” in Hobbes, see
Perez Zagorin, “Cudworth and Hobbes on Is and Ought,” Philosophy, Science, and Religion in
England, 1640–1700, ed. Richard W. F. Kroll, Richard Ashcraft, and Zagorin (Cambridge, Eng.,
1992).
23. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 710.
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of his own, to follow the Reason of any other man, of the voices of many
other men; Which is little better, then to venture his Salvation at crosse
and pile.24
A passage such as this castigating a “Power over the Consciences of
men” makes it difficult to maintain either that “Hobbes does not believe
in freedom of conscience,” or that Hobbes “render[s] conscience null
and void.”25 In granting religious authority to the sovereign and at the
same time praising a state where each man follows “as he liketh best,”
Leviathan called ultimately for sovereigns to intervene only as much as
was required to maintain peace. This was Erastianism, to be sure, but it
accorded more with Selden’s argument that the state could order religion
only “so farr that [disputants] should not cutt one anothers throotes” than
with Parker’s absolutism.26 Goldie captures the gradations of the period
with the observation that “Hobbes was taken to lean towards religious
toleration. But his ecclesiastical reputation remained ambivalent, for
Erastianism could also justify the repression of religious nonconformity.”27
Hobbes doubted that peaceful coexistence could be assured without a
sovereign’s authority to declare doctrine, as Shapin and Schaffer point
out, but he did not require sovereign declarations in every possible
instance.28 “[I]f it be without contention,” diversity was acceptable. That
Leviathan came to occupy something of a no man’s land in the Restoration
debates over toleration, as likely to be mined for arguments as castigated,
is testament to Hobbes’s moderation more than to his absolutism.29
24. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 711. Perhaps defending himself against the bishops, Hobbes
attempted to retreat from this passage by omitting it from his Latin editions, but the three separate
English editions circulating with this passage meant Hobbes’s reputation was difficult to dislodge.
25. The first statement appears in Norberto Bobbio, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural Law
Tradition, tr. Daniela Gobetti (Chicago and London, 1993), p. 70, and reappears without
qualification in White, Natural Law in English Renaissance Literature, p. 244. The second appears in
Martin, “The Phoenix and the Crocodile,” p. 257.
26. John Selden, Table Talk of John Selden, ed. Frederick Pollock (London, 1927), p. 120.
27. Mark Goldie, “The Reception of Hobbes,” The Cambridge History of Political Thought,
1450–1700, ed. J. H. Burns and Mark Goldie (Cambridge, Eng., 1991), p. 614.
28. Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the
Experimental Life (Princeton, 1985), pp. 283–331.
29. See Derek Hirst, “Making All Religion Ridiculous: Of Culture High and Low: The
Polemics of Toleration, 1667–1673,” Renaissance Forum 1.1 (1996). A revised version of this
online essay appears in “Samuel Parker, Andrew Marvell, and Political Culture, 1667–73,” in
Writing and Political Engagement in Seventeenth Century England, ed. Hirst and Richard Strier
(Cambridge, Eng., 1999). See also Gordon J. Schochet, “Between Lambeth and Leviathan:
Samuel Parker on the Church of England and Political Order,” Political Discourse in Early Modern
Britain, ed. Nicholas Philippson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, 1993).
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Hobbes’s concern with heresy in the summer of 1668 continues
Leviathan’s disapproval of the “Power over the Consciences of men.”
Defining heresy as “no more than a private opinion, without reference
to truth and falsehood,” Historical Narration Concerning Heresy concludes
with an anticlerical appeal to “what St. Paul (2 Tim. ii. 24, 25) saith even
in case of obstinate holding of an error: the servant of the Lord must not
strive, but be gentle unto all men, apt to teach, patient, in meekness instructing
those that oppose themselves . . . of which counsel, such fierceness as hath
appeared in the disputation of divines . . . is a violation.”30 What is
more, the 1668 and 1670 Latin editions of Leviathan included extended
discussions critical of laws against heresy that had not been part of the
1651 edition—all of which suggests the extent to which state enforce-
ment of belief troubled the later Hobbes both as a matter of personal
safety and as a theoretical matter, if the two might even be distinguished,
either under the auspices of Hobbesian “self-preservation” or otherwise.31
Given that most of Hobbes’s writing from the Restoration period was
suppressed from publication during his lifetime (in a way Milton’s was
not), it is unclear whether Hobbes appeared to his contemporaries as
a “radical tolerationist,” as Tuck has claimed—Philip Milton has taken
issue with this characterization—but Hobbes’s activities in the late
1660’s indicate his sympathies with tolerant factions of Restoration
politics.32 One of the few pieces of writing Hobbes was able to get past
press controls was a commendatory letter introducing Edward Howard’s
1669 poem The British Princes.33 Noting that critics disagreed with his
previous recommendation of Davenant’s Gondibert, whose royalist
author Milton had once helped to free from prison and who probably
returned the favor when Milton was imprisoned after the Restoration,
Hobbes says that he will nevertheless “take my liberty to praise what
30. Hobbes, Works, IV, 388, 408. Cf. Milton in On Civil Power (1659): “heresie . . . is no word
of evil note; meaning only the choice or following of any opinion good or bad in religion or any
other learning.” CPW, ed. Wolfe, VII, 247.
31. Ryan, “A More Tolerant Hobbes?,” p. 50.
32. Richard Tuck, “Hobbes and Locke on Toleration,” Thomas Hobbes and Political Theory,
ed. Mary G. Dietz (Lawrence, Kan., 1990). Philip Milton attributes Hobbes’s fears to “an over-
active imagination working on an unduly fearful temperament,” an account that is unsatisfactory
in its failure to consider how prevalent—and justified—dissenters’ fears of persecution were.
Milton, “Hobbes, Heresy and Lord Arlington,” p. 503.
33. Since Hobbes understood the book was already licensed when he wrote his letter, the
epistle might be seen as a conscious attempt to bypass press controls. See Hobbes, Correspondence,
II, 704–05.
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I like as well as they do to reprehend what they do not like.”34 The
phrase might not raise any eyebrows were it not for the volume in which
it appears. Howard’s poem was dedicated to a Catholic, and Edward
Howard was the brother of Sir Robert Howard, the Dryden opponent
who had spearheaded Parliament’s charge against Clarendon in 1667,
managing the impeachment conference with the House of Lords. In his
pursuit of Clarendon, “Nothing but impeachment . . . would satisfy
Howard,” Oliver reports.35 When The British Princes was published, Sir
Robert Howard was collaborating with the future Cabal minister and
outspoken tolerationist Buckingham.36 It was Buckingham, whom Sir
Robert Howard considered “a great man,” who had introduced the
tolerationist legislation that Parliament considered in 1668.37 For Hobbes
to lend his name to such a volume indicates something of a common
cause, and his swipe at those who “reprehend what they do not like”
therefore takes on a decidedly tolerationist coloring. Yet even more
significant is what gets left out of Hobbes’s October 24, 1668 manuscript
letter when the volume goes to print in 1669. In both the manuscript and
the printed version, Hobbes guardedly recommends the poem, but in
print the following is omitted: “I have told you my judgment and you
may make use of it as you please. But I remember a line or two in your
poem that touched upon divinity, wherein we differed in opinion. But
since you say the book is licensed, I shall think no more upon it, but only
reserve my liberty of dissenting, which I know you will allow me.”38
With Parliament scheduled to reconvene on November 10th and non-
conformity near the top of its agenda, the phrase “liberty of dissenting”
could hardly be used lightly. Nor, apparently, could it be used publicly.
Yet privately—we do not know who omitted the passage—Hobbes
is willing to both claim and grant religious liberty, cordially agreeing—
in stark contrast to Parliament’s treatment of dissenters—to “think no
more upon it.”
Hobbes’s willingness to claim “my liberty of dissenting” brings into
question his own religious beliefs, about which little is known and much
34. See The Early Lives of Milton, ed. Helen Darbishire (London, 1932), pp. 272–74, Edward
Howard, The Brittish Princes: An Heroick Poem (1669), sig. [A8].
35. H. J. Oliver, Sir Robert Howard, 1626–1698: A Critical Biography (Durham, N.C., 1963),
p. 134.
36. J. P. Vander Motten, “Howard, Sir Robert (1626–1698),” DNB.
37. Oliver, Sir Robert Howard, 1626–1698: A Critical Biography, p. 134.
38. Hobbes, Correspondence, II, 704–05.
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is speculated. His opponents, of course, often charged him with atheism,
but the fact, often ignored, that the latter third of Leviathan is given over
to spiritual concerns militates against that charge.39 More plausible is
Tuck’s suggestion that Hobbes, like Milton perhaps, held heretical
Socinian beliefs. Hobbes’s continued antagonism toward the harshest
elements of Anglican uniformity certainly buttresses that argument.40
In any case, as John Pocock has shown, the fact that Samuel Parker could
allude to Leviathan’s frontispiece as an example of gnosticism underscores
how slim the distinction could be between religious “enthusiasm,” a
charge leveled at Milton, and the “atheism” with which Hobbes was
most often accused.41
Emerging from this account of Hobbes’s activities in the 1660s is
one answer to the question of why Aubrey revised his description of
Hobbes’s and Milton’s relationship. Judging from Behemoth, where
Hobbes blamed the Civil War on rebels’ reading “the books written by
famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths con-
cerning their polity and great actions,” Aubrey was right that Milton and
Hobbes had differing interests.42 Yet in the same work could be found
Hobbes’s critique of “the power to determine points of faith, and to be
judges in the inner court of conscience of moral duties, and a power to
punish those men, that obey not their precepts, by ecclesiastical cen-
sure.”43 Keeping both strains in view, we can imagine why Milton, a
man who married Katherine Woodcock in a civil ceremony because he
denied clerical authority over marriage, “would acknowledge [Hobbes]
to be a man of great parts, and a learned man” even as he “did not like
39. Richard Tuck, “The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes,” Political Discourse in Early Modern
Britain, ed. Nicholas Phillipson and Quentin Skinner (Cambridge, Eng., 1993). Jeffrey R. Collins,
The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes (Oxford, 2005) argues Hobbes’s treatment of religion is consistently
“instrumental,” pp. 37–52.
40. On Hobbes and Socinianism, see Tuck, “The Civil Religion of Thomas Hobbes,” p. 131.
On Milton, see Michael Lieb, “Milton and the Socinian Heresy,” Milton and the Grounds of
Contention, ed. Mark R. Kelley, Michael Lieb, and John T. Shawcross (Pittsburgh, 2003), William
Kolbrener, “The Charge of Socinianism: Charles Leslie’s High Church Defense of ‘True Religion’,”
The Journal of the Historical Society 3.1 (2003).
41. J. G. A. Pocock, “Thomas Hobbes, Atheist or Enthusiast? His Place in a Restoration
Debate,” History of Political Thought 11.4 (1990). On “enthusiasm” as a disparaging term used
by defenders of uniformity, see Sharon Achinstein, Literature and Dissent in Milton’s England
(Cambridge, Eng., 2003), pp. 154–81.
42. Hobbes, Works, VI, 168.
43. Hobbes, Works, VI, 171.
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him at all.”44 Hobbes was notoriously prickly, and he was clearly dis-
gusted at the “rebellion.” Yet his iconoclasm led Waller to observe, in
terms the author of Samson Agonistes would have appreciated, that
Hobbes, although “a private person, pulled down all the churches,
dispelled the mists of ignorance, and laid open their priestcraft.”45 In a
work written in the mid-1670’s, Albertus Warren included Hobbes in
the tolerationist pantheon with Milton, Erasmus, Baxter, and Grotius,
among others, as those who “have unanimously approv’d of Reason as
the best Guide, and favour’d, or cooly advis’d, a circumscrib’d Tolera-
tion.”46 As Collins remarks, “If we focus on [the] ecclesiological axis,
running between Erastians and clericalists, Hobbes was much closer to
the Cromwellian Independents than to the Presbyterians (or Episcopalians)
loyal to the Stuart dynasty.”47 To be sure, focus on the “ecclesiological
axis” runs the risk of eclipsing important areas of disagreement between
Hobbes and Milton. However, for many writers in the late 1660’s and
early 1670’s, especially those persecuted by the state, the question of
most immediate concern was the question of religious toleration.
i i i
Having attempted to coax out a “more tolerant Hobbes,” I want now to
illuminate the welcome reception particular elements of Hobbes’s work
found among a number of religious dissenters—my attempt, that is, to
show more Hobbesian tolerationists. This is a story best told by tracking
the use of a phrase that in the 1660’s had became the shibboleth of
“Hobbism,” “self-preservation.” In sentiments that were already famous
and were circulating with new vigor in the late 1660’s, Hobbes had
written in Leviathan: “And because the condition of Man . . . is a
44. Aubrey, “Collections for the Life of Milton,” p. 1023. On Milton’s marriage to Katherine
Woodcock in a civil ceremony, and his views on marriage more generally, see Rosenblatt, Torah
and Law in Paradise Lost, esp. pp. 87–93.
45. Aubrey’s “Brief Lives,” ed. Clark, I, 358.
46. Albertus Warren, An Apology for the Discourse of Humane Reason, Early English Books,
1641–1700 / 1135:10 (1680), p. 142. Martin Dzelzainis has recently brought this important allusion
to our attention. See his “Albertus Warren on Milton and Toleration: An Unnoticed Allusion,”
Notes and Queries 46:244 (1999), p. 3.
47. Jeffrey Collins, “Silencing Thomas Hobbes: The Presbyterians and Their Printers,”
2004, a paper presented at The History of Books and Intellectual History Conference at
Princeton University, December 3–5, 2004, Available: http://csb.princeton.edu/index.php?app=
download&id=11, 25 January 2005. I am grateful to Dr. Collins for his permission to quote from
a then unpublished work. But see now Collins, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes.
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condition of Warre of every one against every one; in which case every
one is governed by his own Reason; and there is nothing he can make
use of, that may not be a help unto him, in preserving his life against his
enemyes; It followeth, that in such a condition, every man has a Right
to every thing; even to one anothers body. And therefore, as long as this
naturall Right of every man to every thing endureth, there can be no
security to any man, (how strong or wise soever he be,) of living out
the time, which Nature ordinarily alloweth men to live.”48 These were
provocative notions with Grotian undertones.49 Attempting to take the
sting from them but indicating also what made Hobbes sui generis, one
Restoration opponent accused Hobbes of simply dressing up common-
places with the unique vocabulary of self-preservation: “it is an easie matter,”
he wrote, to take old ideas and “scatter up and down some little insinuations
of the state of nature, self preservation, and such like fundamental phrases.”50
Before attending to Hobbes’s “fundamental phrase” “self-preservation,”
it is worth remarking on the general renaissance Hobbes’s Leviathan
found in the late 1660’s and early 1670’s, coinciding with the debates
over toleration. The renaissance would be the envy of contemporary
marketing executives and entailed all the elements of a contemporary
cultural controversy—the emergence of a provocative work, followed
by denunciations and defenses, and ultimately huge sales. Pepys’s Diary
for September 3, 1668 records that Pepys went “To my bookseller’s for
‘Hobbes’s Leviathan’, which is now mightily called for: and what was
heretofore sold for 8s. I now give for 24s. at the second hand, and is sold
for 30s.”51Leviathan was first published in Latin that same year in Amster-
dam as part of Hobbes’s collected works, and must have been in high
demand, for it was published again in 1670, when Hobbes published the
Latin edition alone, also in Amsterdam. One or both of the two illicit
editions of Leviathan bearing a 1651 date—known for their publishers’
48. Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 189–90.
49. It is useful to compare this passage to Grotius: “Among the first Impressions of Nature
there is nothing repugnant to War; nay, all Things rather favour it: For both the End of War
(being the Preservation of Life or Limbs, and either the securing or getting Things useful to Life)
is very agreeable to those first Motions of Nature; and to make use of Force, in case of Necessity,
is in no wise disagreeable thereunto.” See Hugo Grotius, The Rights of War and Peace, ed.,
Richard Tuck, tr. J. Barbeyrac (Indianapolis, 2005), pp. 182–83.
50. John Eachard, Mr. Hobbs’s State of Nature Considered in a Dialogue, Early English Books,
1641–1700 / 1258:18 (1672), pp. 13–14.
51. Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription, ed. Robert
Latham and William Matthews, 11 vols. (London, 1970), IX, 298.
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marks as “the Bear” and “the 25-ornaments”—may have been published
during this period as well, the former having probably been printed by a
Dutchman who between 1665 and 1674 was responsible for eighteen
controversial Quaker publications.52 The publication of the collected
works in 1668, three years before Milton’s 1671 publication of the “two-
edged sword” volume that would contain Paradise Regained and Samson
Agonistes,53 coincided with Hobbes’s limited return to English court
favor in November of the previous year with the fall of Clarendon and
the rise of the Cabal. “I love our Nation, and all men in it so well,” John
Eachard wrote, “that I wish they had given [Hobbes] less entertainment;
it had been more for their honour and credit; and the good of this Realm.”54
That Leviathan was heavily sought after is not a surefire indicator that it
was heavily read, but it suggests that in some London circles, at least,
there was what Pierre Bourdieu calls “cultural capital” to be gained by
the appearance of having read it.
In the summer of 1669 the demand for that capital was revved up by
an unlikely source, whose origin shows one of the craftiest reactions to
the Hobbes revival then underway, and also offers an important context
for Milton’s Samson Agonistes. Leviathan’s republication had been met by
fresh scorn from the Anglican bishops, who took issue most loudly with
Hobbes’s supposed moral relativism, although they understood too that
his Erastianism eliminated an independent clergy.55 In 1668, a promising
Cambridge fellow named Daniel Scargill found himself at the center of
a university show-trial for advancing a series of theses in academic dis-
putations judged to be too close to Hobbes’s for the university’s tastes.56
52. Leviathan, ed. C. B. MacPherson (London, 1968), pp. 67–68, Noel Malcolm, Aspects of
Hobbes (Oxford, 2002), pp. 379, 370–82. Malcolm speculates that “the Bear” was printed some-
what later, between 1675–1680, but notes in any case that Christoffel Cunradus, who also printed
a Socinian tract and a host of other dissenting works, could have been attracted to Hobbes’s “ideas
about religious toleration [which], although ambiguous where the role of the state was concerned,
were set firmly against ecclesiastical jurisdiction and persecution,” p. 380.
53. David Loewenstein, Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries: Religion,
Politics, and Polemics in Radical Puritanism (Cambridge, Eng., 2001), p. 295.
54. Eachard, Mr. Hobbs’s State of Nature Considered, p. 10.
55. The most complete account of Anglicans’ responses to Hobbes can still be found in
Samuel I. Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan: Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and
Moral Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes (Cambridge, Eng., 1962).
56. Daniel Scargill, The Recantation of Daniel Scargill, Publickly Made before the University of
Cambridge; in Great St. Marie, July 25, 1669 (Cambridge, 1669), p. 1. Jon Parkin gives the best
existing account of this affair, in “Hobbism in the Later 1660s: Daniel Scargill and Samuel
Parker,” The Historical Journal 42.1 (1999).
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Historians have tended to overlook the show-trial aspect of the Scargill
affair, emphasizing it as an indicator of the extremity of Hobbes’s
thought. I hope to synthesize these two views. In an academic community
flirting, in many places, with officially illicit mechanism and neo-Epicurean
materialism, Scargill was singled out for defending the increasingly
troublesome theses that the origin of the world could be explained
mechanically, that the system of the universe does not prove that God
exists, and most controversially, that civil law is what defines categories
of good and evil.57 Talk of Scargill’s theses, and his 1669 recantation
of his “Hobbist” beliefs, “fill[ed] all mouths” in Cambridge.58 Yet the
audience for Scargill’s public censure went beyond Cambridge. Tell-
ingly, the university issued Scargill’s (likely forced) Recantation in
pamphlet form the very day he recanted to the congregation at Great St.
Mary’s, July 25, 1669. As might have been expected, the text quickly
made its way to London. According to a contemporary report, Scargill
became “infamous throughout the University if not the whole nation.”59
What readers soon had in hand was a textual apparatus obviously
designed to halt the spread of Hobbism, for in it readers found a cartoonish
summary of Hobbes’s thought (“if the Devil were omnipotent he ought
to be obeyed”60) that was superintended by authoritative reproach and
whose folly was made evident by the dazzlingly debauched lifestyle to
which Scargill seemingly confessed. It made such a splash that Hobbes
himself allegedly responded to it.61 The Recantation illuminates the chasm
between the official line on Hobbism and the reality: Scargill is depicted
as an errant apostate whose wildly radical subscription to Hobbism is
consistent with a wildly libertine lifestyle. Scargill admits to living “in
great licentiousness, swearing rashly, drinking intemperately, boasting
my self insolently, corrupting others by my pernicious principles and
example, to the high Dishonour of God.”62 Yet such a figure of Scargill
inadvertently tells a different story too. It seemed necessary because
precisely the opposite was true: elements of Hobbes’s thought were
gaining hold in unexpected quarters, and the Anglican establishment
57. Scargill, p. 1.
58. Parkin, p. 94, fn. 37, p. 102, fn. 59.
59. Parkin, p. 94, fn. 37.
60. Scargill, p. 1.
61. The response has been lost. Aubrey, Brief Lives, ed. Clark, I, 360.
62. Scargill, Recantation, pp. 3–4. Hobbes and libertinism were commonly linked in Restoration
discourse. See Warren L. Chernaik, Sexual Freedom in Restoration Literature (Cambridge, Eng.,
1995), “Hobbes and the Libertines,” pp. 22–51.
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intent on uniformity judged that characterizing a Hobbist as a dissolute
renegade (when in fact many in London were reading Hobbes) might be
an effective countermeasure.
Anglicans saw and sought to limit the way persecuted dissenters were
keying into one facet of Hobbes’s thought: the primacy of self-preservation.63
The Recantation reads “I beleeve also, and openly avouch, That no
power upon earth; no perswasion or imagination about natural Right;
no opinion in pretended Philosophie concerning self-preservation, can
free me from the obligation that is now upon me, in this my open
profession of Repentance for my accursed errors and grievous sins,
to speak the truth in sincerity before God and man” (p. 6). It was
Hobbes’s advancement of self-preservation as natural law that made the
Cambridge authorities require that Scargill explicitly attest to the sincerity
of his turnabout, “lest any one should mistake or suspect this confession
and unfeigned renunciation of my sinful and accused errours, for an act
of civil obedience or submission in me, performed according to my
former principles” (p. 5). Sincerity had been called into question by the
law of self-preservation because those taking oaths could no longer safely
be assumed to mean what they said, or so the Recantation sought to con-
vey. It was apparently feared that an allegiance to self-preservation
would lead to actions at variance with inward beliefs. Those submitting
to authorities now, apparently, not only had to recant but positively to
affirm they meant it. Scargill therefore had to deny his turnabout was “at
the command of my Superiors, in outward expression of words, although
contrary to my judgment and inward thoughts of my heart” (p. 5).
We can see how common a version of Scargill’s dilemma was in the
late 1660’s when we consider the problem of occasional conformity, in
which Puritans, Baptists, Congregationalists and other sectaries had to
decide whether to attend Anglican church services and what to do when
they were there.64 The growing primacy of self-preservation as a funda-
mental motivator helped to stage what Sharon Achinstein calls “the
drama of dissent” (p. 133). Therefore, sometimes to the exclusion of
much else Hobbes had written, “self-preservation” re-emerged in the
late 1660’s as a battleground on which debates over toleration were
63. On radical plots in the Restoration, see Richard L. Greaves, Enemies under His Feet:
Radicals and Nonconformists in Britain, 1664–1677 (Stanford, Calif., 1990). See also Melinda S. Zook,
Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial Politics (University Park, Penn, 1999).
64. Sharon Achinstein, “Samson Agonistes and the Drama of Dissent,” Milton Studies, 33, ed.
Albert C. Labriola and Michael Lieb (Pittsburgh, 1997).
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pitched, informing interpretations of the state’s repression and the polit-
ical subject’s obligations to the state. In the course of a work claiming
sovereign prerogative, Hobbes in Leviathan had called the individual’s
natural “right” to self-preservation inalienable; “no man can be under-
stood by any words, or other signes, to have abandoned, or transferred”
it (p. 192). In the 1660s we can see dissenters latching onto the utility of
this claim and powerful Anglicans and Presbyterians, who in some cases
were admirers of Leviathan’s strong claims for de facto rule, attempting to
discredit what they instinctively felt was the work’s subversion.
Perhaps one reason so few critics have noticed the link between
Hobbes and dissenters is that dissenters almost never state their debts to
Hobbes. This was for obvious reasons: many found enormous swaths of
his thought repugnant—particularly those dissenters, like Milton, who
held an abiding republicanism. For the more pragmatic, citing Hobbes
would have alienated the polite society they hoped to win over.65 The
exception that proves the rule is the Quaker Robert Rich, who wrote
admiringly of “Brave Mr. Hobbs” in his Love Without Dissimulation
(1666).66 Yet if dissenters rarely invoked Hobbes explicitly, their oppon-
ents nevertheless would not allow them to co-opt Hobbes without
reproach, and so shone the light on their opponents’ strategy. We can
therefore start with John Shafte, who in 1670 defended uniformity with
a tract entitled, The Great Law of nature; or, self-preservation examined,
asserted and vindicated from Mr Hobbes his abuses.67 Shafte despairs that dis-
senters have been employing Hobbesian arguments for their cases of
conscience, arguments “grounded upon the same Principles of Self-
preservation.” He writes, “the greatest part of [dissenters’] . . . Errours
seem to be deduced from Mr. Hobbes his definition of the Right of
Nature” and laments that Hobbes’s followers “challenge to themselves
Liberty of Conscience, or a publick free exersise of what Religion they
65. On this topic see John Patrick Montaño, Courting the Moderates: Ideology, Propaganda,
and the Emergence of Party, 1660–1678 (London, 2002). Derek Hirst also addresses this aspect of
Restoration polemic in Hirst, “Making All Religion Ridiculous.”
66. Nicholas McDowell, The English Radical Imagination: Culture, Religion, and Revolution,
1630–1660 (Oxford, 2003), pp. 172, 137–82. In his excellent chapter on Quakerism, skepticism,
and “the Radical Enlightenment,” McDowell also valuably demonstrates the intellectual links
between Hobbes and his friend the Independent and Quaker defender Henry Stubbe, who was
also, for a time, a client of Sir Henry Vane.
67. John Shafte, The Great Law of Nature; or Self-Preservation, Examined, Asserted, and Vindicated
from Mr. Hobbes His Abuses (1673). According to the author, the work was composed in 1670 and
1671 and circulated in manuscript before it was published in 1673 (sig. A2).
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best fancy” (p. 2). Eachard lampoons Hobbes for “Making out all men to
be Rational beasts . . . and every man when he pleases a Rational
Rebel . . . with all demureness, solemnity, quotation of Scripture,
appeals to Conscience and Church—History.”68 “[D]on’t mistake your
selves,” he writes: “[H]e’s every whit as much against the Civil Power,
as Ecclesiastical . . . As for the rest of his Politicks, they are such as are
known to every Dragoon: and when he writ them, as he pretended, for
the immortal Peace of his Country; he might e’en as well have put out
a Regular System to teach people how to charge a Gun” (sigs. A7–A7v).
Eachard’s evaluation—shared by many royalist Anglicans—that Hobbes
was responsible for encouraging the “Rational Rebels” of conscience
persisted at least until the aftermath of the Rye House Plot in 1683.69
Some of the reasons Oxford gave for burning Hobbes’s books can
direct our attention to the radicals’ most troublesome arguments and so
will provide the last guideposts before we turn to dissenters’ pamphlets
and then, finally, to Samson Agonistes. Predictably, the university found
fault with Hobbes’s arguments that “Self preservation is the fundamental
obligation of nature, and supercedes the obligation of all others, when
ever they stand in competition with it” and that “Every man after enter-
ing into a society retains a right of defending himself against force, and
cannot transfer that right to the Commonwealth.”70 These were radical,
but straightforward Hobbesian claims. The Judgment and Decree also
demonstrated the university’s awareness of a subtler implication of these
claims, namely that “not only a foreign Invader but a domestic Rebel
puts himselfe again into a state of nature to be proceeded against not as a
subject but as an enemy: and consequently aquires by his rebellion the
same right over the life of his prince, as the Prince for the most heinous
crimes has over the life of his own Subjects” (p. 3). Oxford was thus aware
of a facet to Hobbes’s thought that many religious and political radicals
came to understand in the previous decades: that however terrible
Hobbes’s state of nature seemed to be, there was a benefit to be had by
considering themselves in it—and in persuading their compatriots they
were in that state too. With a simple shift in attitude, it seemed, one
could acquire rights against the state he or she did not previously have.
68. John Eachard, Some Opinions of Mr. Hobbs Considered in a Second Dialogue between Philautus
and Timothy, by the Same Author J. Eachard (1673) sig. [A5].
69. The Judgment and Decree of the University of Oxford. See Zook, Radical Whigs and Conspiratorial
Politics, p. 38.
70. The Judgment and Decree of the University of Oxford, pp. 3–4.
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Each of Hobbes’s claims identified by the University had found
expression in dissenting arguments. Dissenters around 1670, as De Krey
has shown, granted varying authority to civil magistrates over matters
of belief.71 The prominent Congregationalist preacher John Owen and
latitudinarian Presbyterian divine John Humfrey made their cases for
conscience conceding, as Hobbes did, the magistracy’s jurisdiction over
church matters: their hope too was for indulgence.72 The more radical
voices, however, denied civil power had any such jurisdiction in the first
place. I will explore claims of self-preservation among both sets, looking
first at the moderate royalist Richard Baxter, then turning briefly to
Robert Ferguson, Sir Charles Wolseley, William Penn, and Nicholas
Lockyer.
Despite major philosophical differences between the two, the Pres-
byterian non-conformist Richard Baxter shared with Hobbes a hope for
a broader state church, preferably under a monarch. Perhaps because he
understood Hobbes to encourage subscription to de facto power, Baxter
in the Commonwealth years preached against Leviathan and may have
encouraged a campaign of Presbyterian printers to censor Hobbes.73
That Baxter makes some of the most explicit cases for self-preservation,
therefore, is all the more surprising.74 For Baxter, nonconformity was an
unambiguous act of self-preservation. Nowhere do we see a materialist
invocation of a warlike natural state as in Hobbes; instead self-preservation
explicitly becomes God’s law. Refusing to hear a harmful sermon was
“act of obedience to God, and of self-preservation”—the two were consist-
ent: “As Souldiers must forsake a trayterous General, or Seamen a
perfidious or desperately unskilful Pilot that would cast them all away[,]
. . . so may they in such a case refuse [to hear a sermon], without usurp-
ing any Government themselves.”75 Baxter would soon elaborate on the
importance of self-preservation in a way that further differentiated it
from Hobbes’s materialist conception. He wrote of the “rational Love of
Happiness and self-preservation which God did put into innocent
Adam, and hath planted in mans nature as necessary to his Government.”76
71. See Gary De Krey, “Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting Cases for Conscience, 1667–
1672,” Historical Journal 38.1 (1995).
72. De Krey, p. 57.
73. Collins, “Silencing Thomas Hobbes: The Presbyterians and Their Printers.”
74. It would be a fair objection to say that Baxter re-Christianizes Hobbesian “self-preservation,”
which had been latent in Grotius.
75. Baxter, The Cure of Church-Divisions (1670), p. 96.
76. Baxter, A Christian Directory, Early English Books, 1641–1700 / 343:11 (1673), p. 147.
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“Self-preservation” became a “duty,” along with “Piety, Justice, [and]
Charity” (p. 166). In its persecution of dissenters England violated this
duty: “[A]s self-preservation is the chief principle in the Natural body,
which causeth it to abhorr the wounding, or amputation of its members,
and to avoid division as destruction, except when a gangrened member
must be cut off, for the saving of the body; so it is also with the mystical
body of Christ. He is senseless and graceless that abhorreth not Church-
wounds” (pp. 740–41). Richard Baxter effectively shared with Hobbes
a vision of a broader state church based on the primacy of self-preservation,
but in proposing such a vision, he threw an elaborately constructed
Christian tent over Hobbes’s materialist rationale.
The Independent Robert Ferguson, a Shaftesbury client and future
Rye House plotter, like many tolerationists, was quick in his reply to
Parker’s Ecclesiastical Polity to distance himself from “Hobbs and some
other wild, Atheistically disposed persons of late” who, he says, “have
managed an opposition to all natural Laws.”77 If inaccurate, that distance
is plausible until he cites as natural law Hobbes’s signal idea, “the instinct
of self-preservation all men are by Nature imbued with” (p. 231). He slyly
argues that “Sincere Obedience to the whole Law of Creation is not only still
required, but it is required under the penalty of Damnation,” thereby not only
requiring acts of self-preservation since self-preservation is part of the
“Law of Creation” but turning that instinct toward a concern for pre-
servation in the afterlife (p. 162). Hobbes undergoes a Christianizing
in Ferguson, as he does in Baxter. For example, theologized echoes of
Hobbesian self-preservation appear in Ferguson’s digressions on suicide,
for their allowance of which he castigates the pagans. Suicide means
“invading the jurisdiction which belongs to God, who only hath power
to dispose of us” (p. 229). As in Samson, here we see the conjunction
of radical tolerationism, which casts a space outside the state’s purview
where encroachment amounts to “invasion,” and self-preservationism,
where preserving ourselves is preserving “the jurisdiction which belongs
to God.”
Ferguson dedicated A Sober Enquiry to Sir Charles Wolseley, the
former Independent M. P. who was “one of a few men in Cromwell’s
inner circle who advocated a greater degree of toleration in religion than
77. Robert Ferguson, A Sober Enquiry into the Nature, Measure, and Principle of Moral Virtue,
with Reflections Upon Three Late Books by S. Parker by R.F. (1673), p. 51.
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Cromwell himself.”78 In 1668, Wolseley had published anonymously
Liberty of Conscience the Magistrates Interest denying the state’s jurisdiction
over religious matters and claiming “every man in the World is to be a
Judge for himself, in all matters of the Gospel Religion.”79 “[T]o say a
man is not to judge for himself, is to unman him,” he continued (p. 44).
The link between the individual judgment and the natural constitution
of man had been critical to Hobbes, and the notion that joined them,
again, had been self-preservation. In the arena of self-preservation the
individual judgment was all. In Leviathan, Hobbes had written, “As first
a man cannot lay down the right of resisting them, that assault him by
force, to take away his life; because he cannot be understood to ayme
thereby, at any Good to himselfe. The same may be sayd of Wounds, and
Chayns, and Imprisonment; both because there is no benefit consequent
to such patience; as there is to the patience of suffering another to be
wounded, or imprisoned: as also because a man cannot tell, when he
seeth men proceed against him by violence, whether they intend his death
or not” (p. 192). Even after consent had been given over to a sovereign,
other men’s intentions were fundamentally unknowable. Resistance was
therefore an epistemological question: because “a man cannot tell” what
harm awaits him, he maintains his right to judge and thus to resist. In this
way a functional characteristic of the state of nature persists in human
fallibility, and as the Oxford book burners observed, was accessible by
other means: when it even appears men are proceeding against us to hurt
or imprison us, dissenters could reason, we have returned to the state of
nature. Any obligations to submit to civil authority, the most radical could
imagine, had therefore been dissolved. Many readers of Leviathan mis-
interpret or miss the importance of this passage. For example, in the course
of an otherwise trenchant book Giorgio Agamben concludes, “In Hobbes
the state of nature survives in the person of the sovereign, who is the
only one to preserve its natural ius contra omnes.”80 To the contrary, the
potential to wage war against all—the sovereign power—survives through
human fallibility in each individual’s concern for self-preservation.
78. Timothy Venning, “Wolseley [Ouseley], Sir Charles, Second Baronet, Appointed Lord
Wolseley under the Protectorate (1629/30–1714),” DNB; De Krey, “Dissenting Cases for
Conscience,” pp. 62–65.
79. Charles Wolseley, Liberty of Conscience, the Magistrate’s Interest (1668), p. 42.
80. Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, tr. Daniel Heller-Roazen
(Stanford, Calif., 1998), p. 35. An exception is Glenn Burgess, “On Hobbesian Resistance Theory,”
Political Studies 42 (1994).
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Consequently, we should pay close attention to self-constructed
performances of quietism that create the appearance of attack. Hobbes’s
figure haunts such constructions in the question of whether state
enforcement of belief amounts to a declaration of war against noncon-
formists, and thus a return to a Hobbesian natural state. With absolutists
like Parker insisting that stringent uniformity must be used to quell
rebellious dissent and thereby preserve the peace, dissenters often denied
there was any present peace to be preserved, casting persecution as
the state’s declaration of war against its citizens and their own actions
as self-defense. The Quaker leader William Penn, for example, wrote,
“peace . . . has been . . . broken by the frequent Tumultuary Disturbances
that ensue the Disquieting our meetings.”81 Perhaps recalling that the
threat of imprisonment was sufficient grounds for resistance in Hobbes,
Penn decried the state’s treatment of Quaker prisoners of conscience as
“not more unchristian than inhumane,” concluding, “Where Liberty
and Property are destroyed, there must always be a state of force and war,
which however pleasing it may be unto the Invaders, it will be esteemed
intolerable by the Invaded, who will no longer remain subject.”82
Eachard must have had charged passages like this in mind when he
denounced “those that are feigned to be in [the] condition” of Hobbes’s
natural state.83 Nicholas Lockyer wondered in a work he published
anonymously in 1670 but whose publication nevertheless required him
to flee to Holland, what if “the chiefest of the Persecutors” were so dealt
with “In their solemn Worship to be so hared and disturbed by a Tumult
and Rabble; to be tore and haled from their places and Assemblies, and
imprisoned by Officers and armed men[?]”84 And “Will any wise State
judge it according to the principles of Wisdom and Policy by threatened
ruine and destruction to irritate such a People, having heretofore also
tasted the ill consequence of such like provocations?” (p. 10).
If narratives of peaceful worship invaded by state agents are every-
where in dissenting literature, Hobbes is just offstage. Words like “hared,”
“tumult,” and “torn” emphasized the confusion caused by the invasions,
81. William Penn, The Great Case of Liberty of Conscience (1671), p. 28. Given the temptation
to see Penn and the Quakers as quietist, it is worth remembering that Penn was the son of one of
England’s most successful naval commanders.
82. William Penn, The Peoples Ancient and Just Liberties Asserted (1670, 1810), pp. 40, 48.
83. Eachard, Mr. Hobbs’s State of Nature Considered, sig. a1v.
84. Nicholas Lockyer, Some Seasonable and Serious Queries Upon the Late Act against Conventicles,
by a Friend to Truth and Peace N. Lockyer (1670), p. 8.
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thus ratcheting up the uncertainty that could further legitimize Hobbesian
violence. When the 1670 bill authorized paying informers to infiltrate
conventicles, a provision that immediately produced a new class of pro-
fessional informers, the state’s invasions deepened the epistemological
crisis.85 An informer “Ferrets a Conventicle just as a Poll cat, does Rabbets
in their Burroughs,” one anonymous author wrote, and “will Court a
man to beat him . . . and dropp dangerous words on purpose to prose-
cute you for Concealing them.”86 Even in worship, friend and foe were
now indistinguishable.
iv
It has been said, “A Rubicon was crossed with the reception of Hobbes
into western thinking.”87 I want to examine Samson Agonistes’ role in
such a reception by situating the drama as a screen onto which the
epistemological crisis created by the Clarendon Code gets projected,
and also as a projector of that same epistemological crisis through time.
Just recently, critics have come to see Samson as an encounter with Hobbes.
But what kind of encounter? Martin construes the drama as a reproof
against the “Hobbesian” Philistines and “Dagon or Leviathan.”88 Kahn,
by contrast, suggests it “may draw on the arguments of Grotius, Hobbes,
and others regarding the status of the captive who has not consented
to his conqueror.”89 Which is it? Seeming at first contradictory, these
interpretations are not mutually exclusive, for together they capture the
idiosyncratic reception of Hobbes among dissenters, where royalist uni-
formity was as repugnant as the primacy of self-preservation was useful.90
The reading of Samson Agonistes that follows, therefore, is one that for
the first time takes into account dissenters’ complicated reception of
85. Douglas Lacey, Dissent and Parliamentary Politics in England, 1661–1689: A Study in the
Perpetuation and Tempering of Parliamentarianism (New Brunswick, N.J., 1969), p. 60.
86. Anon., The Character of an Informer (1675), pp. 4–5, 2.
87. White, Natural Law in English Renaissance Literature, p. 250.
88. Martin, “The Phoenix and the Crocodile,” p. 262.
89. Victoria Kahn, Wayward Contracts: The Crisis of Political Obligation in England, 1640–1674,
pp. 252–53.
90. I am influenced here by Patterson’s observation that “It has become fashionable . . . to
cite out of context Milton’s metaphor in Areopagitica of books as dragon’s teeth sown in the earth
that spring up armed men; but not enough work has been done on what processes are implied
by such sowing and how long they take.” See Annabel M. Patterson, Early Modern Liberalism
(Cambridge, Eng., 1997), p. 22.
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Hobbes and attempts to draw out a few of the implications of Milton’s
reception of Hobbes for the history of political thought.
Famously, two main arguments dominate critical discussions of
Samson. One, advanced by Stanley Fish, Joseph Wittreich, and others,
doubts that God prompts the “rousing motions” that lead Samson to
the destruction of the theater. Samson Agonistes becomes either ironic
or skeptical.91 The other, made persuasively by David Loewenstein and
David Norbrook, is that God does prompt Samson’s rousing motions
and, however distasteful it might be to a liberal academic community,
Milton’s Samson engages in sanctioned killing.92 I propose to bridge
these positions with the contention that the state’s treatment of non-
conformists became the occasion for Milton to dramatize the movement
toward a Hobbesian bodily and epistemological crisis where all violence
was licit.93 In my view the uncertainty that pervades so much of Samson
Agonistes does not critique Samson’s destruction of the theater so much
as it does to authorize it. Within Samson’s growing submission to
God’s grace, emphasized in his movement from “cannot” to “will not”
to “will,” is something neglected in previous accounts of the drama:
Samson’s concomitant submission to the Philistines’ raw power, his gift
of his body to total vulnerability. For Hobbes’s self-preservationism, rights
against the state increased as bodily security decreased; the condition
of full rights thereby engendered was called “sovereignty.” Alongside
Samson’s growing faith is Samson’s growing vulnerability to physical
power, a vulnerability exasperated by epistemological crisis. Seen from
this vantage point, the parallel tracks leading to Samson’s literally blind
submission to the Philistines’ raw power, on the one hand, and his
subsequent sovereign power over them, on the other, constitute a
reception of Hobbes whose themes would dominate the rise of liberalism
91. See Stanley Fish, “Spectacle and Evidence in Samson Agonistes,” Critical Inquiry 15 (1988–
1989); Joseph Wittreich, Interpreting Samson Agonistes (Princeton, 1986); Joseph Wittreich, Shifting
Contexts: Reinterpreting Samson Agonistes (Pittsburgh, 2002).
92. See Loewenstein, Representing Revolution in Milton and His Contemporaries, and David
Norbrook, “Republican Occasions in Paradise Regained and Samson Agonistes,” Paradise Regained
in Context: Genre, Politics, Religion, ed. Albert C. Labriola and David Loewenstein, Milton Studies 42
(Pittsburgh, 2002).
93. I concur with Lewalski’s observation that the drama is comprised of “political choices . . .
characterized by imperfect knowledge and conflicting testimony” as I do with Kahn’s that Samson
explores “the creative fiat of interpretation in the absence of any more secure or more legible
foundation.” See Barbara Kiefer Lewalski, “Milton’s Samson and the ‘New Acquist of True
[Political] Experience’,” Milton Studies, ed. James D. Simmonds, 24 (Pittsburgh, 1988), p. 248;
Kahn, Wayward Contracts, p. 254.
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over the next century. Samson embodies democracy’s vexed paradox
of the “sovereign subject,” who, insofar as he or she is sovereign, can
take lives with legitimacy, but being subject, is vulnerable to the same.94
Occasioned by Parliament’s hostility to dissenters, Milton’s precise
reception of Hobbes, I therefore want to suggest, deserves considerable
scrutiny for a more thorough understanding of the development of
liberal Whiggism.
Sharon Achinstein suggests that Samson “may be the most brilliant piece
of political theory created in the seventeenth century if we think about
political theory not only in terms of a discourse of abstraction, but also of
contemplation . . . and subjective experience.”95 I propose to read
Samson’s subjective experience of imprisonment by the Philistines with
Hobbes’s state of nature in full view. Milton had inconclusively pondered
the prisoner’s obligations in his consideration of the biblical Daniel’s
adherence to Nebuchadnezzar, and wondered genuinely, “What else
could he do? He was a prisoner.”96 Hobbes could be helpful here. As
Oxford observed and Penn perhaps accepted, a Hobbesian prisoner was
no longer obliged to the state—was “separate” from society (to use the
root meaning of “Nazarite”) and now resided in the state of nature.97
We know this, Hobbes said, because “they lead Criminals to Execution,
and Prison, with armed men, notwithstanding that such Criminals have
consented to the Law, by which they are condemned.”98 Hobbes here
recognizes, according to Michael Walzer, that “Prisoner and guard are
simply at war with one another; they are no longer members of the same
state.”99
What does it mean to create characters in such a relationship? The
analysis that follows will be structured around questions of approach:
how does Milton approach his readers, and in turn how is Samson
approached? Like most dramas, Samson has comings and goings, but com-
ings, as we have seen, became critical in Hobbesian self-preservationism
in the way they could signal intent. The Argument makes clear that
Samson is intended as a drama of “visitations.” For natural man, how he
94. Agamben, p. 124.
95. Achinstein, p. 137.
96. CPW, ed. Wolfe, VI, 800.
97. John Milton: Complete Poems and Major Prose, ed. Merritt Y. Hughes, p. 552, fn. 31.
98. Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 199. See also Hobbes, Works, VI, 226.
99. Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (Cambridge,
Mass., 1970), p. 81.
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is visited, how he is approached, is a grave issue. Reliably observant,
Eachard had mocked Hobbes’s timorousness. When a stranger in Each-
ard’s dialogue invites Hobbes for a walk, Hobbes responds, “No, I thank
you, unless I knew your tricks better: you may chance to get behind me,
and bite me by the Legs . . . I know better things than to trust my self
with one that I never saw before. I have but one body, and I desire to
carry it home all to my chamber” (pp. 2–3). By “approach,” therefore,
I mean first the sense captured by Needham’s translation of Selden’s Mare
Clausem quoted by the OED, “by diligent watchfulness discover[ing
enemies’] approaches.” Milton himself provides the spectrum of pos-
sibilities over the short course of a few lines, where approaches can range
from that employed by the man who “Ran on embattled Armies [that
were] clad in Iron” (Samson) to the “safest [man] who stood aloof ” (ll.
129; 135). It is tempting to see characters’ approaches as interstices
“leading up” to “what happens,” but I want to promote them to a
greater importance.
Starting then with the 1671 material volume in which the drama
appears, “PARADISE REGAIN’D. A POEM In IV BOOKS. To which
is added SAMSON AGONISTES,” and keeping the question of
“approach” in mind, we find that Samson could be spied from far off, the
whole of Paradise Regained complexly involved in Milton’s approach.
Seen also against Milton’s spectrum, the prose introduction marks his
approach as at once armed and tentative, gingerly self-defensive yet
poised to fight. As though confirming the threats all around him, Milton
operates defensively in what he calls the “epistle,” defending even its use.
The reason he feels required to give for including it? “Self-defense.” He
explains his epistle appears “though ancient Tragedy use no Prologue,
yet using sometimes, in case of self defense, or explanation, that which
Martial calls an Epistle.” In part of Hobbes’s letter to Edward Howard
that did make it into The British Princes, Hobbes had written, “I am assured
[the poem] will be welcome to the world with its own confidence;
though if it come forth armed with verses and Epistles I cannot tell what to
think of it. For, the great Wits will think themselves threatened, and
rebel.”100 It is here, perhaps, that lessons from Anglicans’ and Presbyterians’
hostile reception of Leviathan combine with his psychology of rebellion—
Hobbes was then working on Behemoth—to provide the vocabulary for
a poetics of the state of nature. Here Milton invokes such a poetics with
100. Hobbes, Correspondence, II, 704. Italics mine.
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the converse of Hobbes’s position, that the armament of an epistle may
be employed, or claim to be employed, in self-defense.
Samson of course is blind, and critics have commented extensively
on his blindness. But from the Hobbesian perspective of the approach,
Samson’s blindness matters for political reasons extending beyond auto-
biography or the doctrine of the “inner light”: Samson is less equipped
to perceive threats.101 The critical paradox, however, is that his vulner-
ability means he is at greater liberty to defend against the threats he does
perceive. Since to be imprisoned is to be released from obligations to the
state, to be blind in prison—“prison within prison / . . . / . . . worst
imprisonment” in the Chorus’ formulation—is to be doubly free to
commit whatever defensive violence against it one can muster (ll. 153–
55).102 In his Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous and Pernicious Errors to
Church and State, in Mr Hobbes’s Book Entitled Leviathan, Clarendon saves
unique vehemence for Hobbes’s contention that “the guilty person is
not only not oblig’d to submit to the Sentence, how just soever, but hath
a right to resist it, and to defend himself by force against the Magistrate
and the Law.”103 That one claim, Clarendon said, had left a king “in so
weak a posture to defend himself, that he hath reason to be afraid of
every man” (p. 143). In Samson we find Hobbes’s link between rights
and physical vulnerability at work: shorn of his strength, imprisoned,
and blind—infinitely vulnerable—Samson has infinite and sovereign
justification to take lives and wage war.
The Chorus’ initial description of Samson is illuminating, for it
demonstrates Samson’s vulnerability and illustrates what the Philistine
state must see too: a formerly powerful body newly defenseless, lying
“at random, carelessly diffus’d, / With languish’t head unpropt, / . . .
abandoned, / And by himself given over” (ll. 118–21). Milton later
constructs Samson’s vulnerability more fully, this time reminding readers
101. For a recent discussion that briefly explores the interplay of sight and threat, see Susannah
B. Mintz, “Dalila’s Touch: Disability and Recognition in Samson Agonistes,” Milton Studies, ed.
Albert C. Labriola, 40 (Pittsburgh, 2001), p. 175.
102. All verse references are to John Milton, ed. Hughes, and are cited parenthetically in the
text.
103. Italics mine. Edward Hyde, Earl of Clarendon, A Brief View and Survey of the Dangerous
and Pernicious Errors to Church and State, in Mr Hobbes’s Book Entitled Leviathan (Oxford, 1676),
p. 138. Clarendon completed A Brief View in exile in April 1670, but the work was published
posthumously in 1676, with a dedication to Charles II. See Martin Dzelzainis, “ ‘Undoubted
Realities’: Clarendon on Sacrilege,” The Historical Journal 33.3 (1990), 515.
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that Samson had in fact provoked the Philistines as well, an historic fact
that amplifies Samson’s danger:
[N]ow [God] hath cast me off as never known,
And to those cruel enemies,
Whom I by his appointement had provok’t
Left me all helpless with th’ irreparable loss
Of sight, reserv’d alive to be repeated
The subject of thir cruelty (ll. 641–46).
After Samson’s initial soliloquy the Chorus comes upon Samson in
“a place nigh, somewhat retir’d” and Samson’s fearful reaction upon
hearing feet corresponds with his danger. Fallen from grace, blind,
imprisoned, and desolate, he presupposes the worst: “But who are
these?” he wonders, “for with joint pace I hear / The tread of many feet
steering this way; / Perhaps my enemies who come to stare / At my
affliction” (ll. 110–13). In the vulnerability of his state he must be
assured: “We come thy friends and neighbors not unknown,” the Chorus
tells him in a line seemingly calculated to demonstrate the threat the
“unknown” poses to an insecure body (l. 180). Assured, Samson adopts
a narrative of his life combining Baxter’s seafaring self-preservationist
similes with Ferguson’s tolerationist argument against suicide—that
the body is a “jurisdiction which belongs to God.” Recalling Baxter’s
“desperately unskilful Pilot,” Samson compares himself to “a foolish
Pilot [who] have shipwreck’t / My vessel trusted to me from above”
( ll. 198–99). As both Baxter and Ferguson did, Milton here Chris-
tianizes Hobbesian self-preservationism in the service of a tolerationist
vision.
That effect is similar in Samson’s initial encounter with Manoa, who
more than any other character save Samson operates under the dictates
of self-preservation, declaring flatly at one point, in a line that must have
shouted its Hobbesian provenance to Milton’s contemporaries, that
Samson should not punish himself because “self-preservation bids” (l.
505). On Manoa’s approach, Samson is now aided by the Chorus’ eyes;
he is told who approaches and, critically, how. Manoa’s “Locks white as
down” remind Samson of his own shorn impotence, and so Manoa’s
approach temporarily “renews th’ assault” Samson perceives (ll. 326,
331). For his part, Manoa, at once a cautious natural man who recalls the
“invincible Samson” but powerful enough still to be a father full of care,
approaches “With careful step,” the Chorus tells Samson (ll. 341; 327).
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Manoa soon laments how the man who once “walk’d [the Philistines’]
streets, / None offering fight; who single combatant / Duell’d thir
Armies” now could not even “save himself against a coward” (ll. 344–
47). As Manoa’s invocation of “self-preservation” indicates, much of
Samson’s psychological despair occurs in this register of saving, or not
saving, himself. As Samson’s self-flagellation draws him toward suicidal
thoughts, Milton indicates such thoughts contravene natural law with
Samson’s lament, “nature within me seems / In all her functions weary
of herself ” (ll. 595–96). Samson’s vulnerable body is itself threatened by
his despair, which “armed with deadly stings / Mangle [his] apprehensive
tenderest parts, / Exasperate, exulcerate, and raise / Dire inflammation”
(ll. 623–26). “Be penitent and for thy fault contrite,” Manoa reprimands
Samson,
But act not in thy own affliction, Son;
Repent the sin, but if the punishment
Thou canst avoid, self-preservation bids;
Or th’ execution leave to high disposal,
And let another hand, not thine, exact
Thy penal forfeit from thyself; (ll. 502–08).
Manoa has often been read as a blundering old man, but his advice to
Samson here would have had considerable poignancy for dissenters
uneasy about their civil disobedience. As they are for Samson, the
doctrines of self-preservation and “another hand” could be both solace
for crippling despair and impetus to action.
If the Chorus could confidently tell Samson, “here comes thy reverend
Sire,” Dalila’s approach comparatively comes shrouded in mystery
(l. 326). Even to the Chorus’ helpful eyes, she is inscrutable: “who is this,
what thing of Sea or Land?” they wonder. “Female of sex it seems” is
about all they can initially suggest before finally concluding that “Some
rich Philistian Matron she may seem, / And now at nearer view, no
other certain / Than Dalila thy wife” (ll. 710–24). Her appearance as told
to him being as suspect as her former actions, Samson insists, “let her not
come near me” (l. 725). Yet however much Dalila’s approach confirms
the primacy of self-preservation, in Dalila we can also see Milton, like
Ferguson, distancing himself from those facets of Hobbesian thought he
and those he hoped to persuade considered most repugnant. Dalila’s
words touch on nearly every perversion implied by Scargill’s cartoonish
Recantation: she is an insincere moral relativist for whom adherence to
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civil authority is the only obligation. No doubt, Milton like Ferguson
wants to steer away from Hobbes, or at least those elements likely to
cause offense. Hobbes, however, is not the main target. As we have seen,
Parker and the Anglican conformists used Hobbes to defend the clergy
in ways Hobbes never sanctioned. Indicating his own resistance to the
Anglicans, Milton places the “Priest / . . . not behind, but ever at
[Dalila’s] ear” (ll. 857–58). It is less Hobbes’s Erastianism than Parker’s
with which Milton here takes issue. Yet if this section partly critiques
Hobbes, its accommodations to him are evident in Dalila’s absurd
suggestion that the state can take “full possession” of her mind and body
to employ her even against her own husband (l. 869). “To the public
good / Private respects must yield, with grave authority” is her warped
rationale, which is admittedly not far from Leviathan’s rationale, nor
from that of Parker’s Discourse (ll. 867–68). But what makes it unpalatable
to Milton is that it contravenes both self-preservationist rationales
articulated by Manoa just a few lines earlier, the Hobbesian materialist
one of the physical body and the Christian one of the body as a “jurisdiction
which belong[s] to God,” the adjective “grave” being Milton’s intimation
that “full possession” is equivalent to spiritual death. As if to make the
primacy of self-preservation even clearer, Milton has Dalila plead, “Let
me approach at least, and touch thy hand,” to which the ever wary
Samson responds, “Not for thy life, lest fierce remembrance wake / My
sudden rage to tear thee joint by joint” (ll. 951–53). If here Samson
behaves as if he is in a Hobbesian state of nature, he also very nearly says it,
denying that he is or ever was the Philistines’ “subject, / . . . under
[any] protection but [his] own” and distinguishing the Philistines from
legitimate authority by calling them an “impious crew / Of men con-
spiring to uphold thir state / By worse than hostile deeds” (ll. 886–88).104
In Leviathan, Hobbes had said that so-called punishment enacted “with-
out precedent publique condemnation, is not to be stiled by the name of
Punishment; but of an hostile act” (p. 354). Just as Milton’s “prison within
prison” grants Samson rights against the state verging on the superfluous,
so too does “worse than hostile deeds” extend the case: Milton seems
everywhere interested to ground Samson’s coming destruction of the
theater in ever-strengthening rights of self-preservation.
104. Martin suggests that Milton draws this language from Cicero’s De Legibus. See Martin,
“The Phoenix and the Crocodile,” p. 255, fn. 22.
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By now, it should be no surprise that Milton describes the “haughty
. . . high-built and proud” giant Harapha’s approach with as much care
as he does the Chorus’, Manoa’s, and Dalila’s (ll. 1069–70). Again,
ominously, the Chorus can offer Samson no security: “Comes he in
peace?” they worry to Samson. Harapha’s “habit carries peace” but “his
brow [carries] defiance,” they warn (l. 1072). As with Dalila, the signals
they get from the visitor are mixed, and the resulting indeterminacy
again raises Samson’s spine. The precise wording Samson’s belligerence
takes, however, indicates Milton’s interest in highlighting Samson’s
limitations—the handicaps of imprisonment and blindness that come
ultimately to license unrestrained human freedom. He proposes to fight
in “Some narrow place enclos’d, where sight may give thee, / Or rather
flight, no great advantage on me,” a proposal that in the course of
Samson’s bluster primarily serves to remind readers of his limitations
(and by inference, liberties). Neither should it be surprising that the
Officer’s approach with “A Scepter or quaint staff ” in hand leads the
Chorus to conclude warily, “Perhaps more trouble is behind” (ll. 1303,
1300).105 The Chorus’ observations and judgments—friend, foe, or we
don’t know—provide just those visual cues necessary for the survival of
a Hobbesian natural man, and ultimately help to protect Samson, if also,
like the Nazarite law to which they submit and he does not, to constrain
him.106 This was Hobbes’s fundamental bargain: liberty given over in
fear in exchange for protection.
How are we to act, however, when the state created to protect its
citizens now assaults them and imprisons them for their beliefs? When its
bribes make it difficult to tell friend from foe? Hobbes had perhaps
unwittingly given an answer: “He that is subject to no Civill Law,
sinneth in all he does against his Conscience.”107 In the absence of all
evident protection but God’s, “natural” rights of self-preservation spring
forth like “armed men” from the earth: conscience and self-preservation
105. “Quaint” here retains the “bad sense” given by the OED 1b of “cunning, crafty, given
to scheming or plotting,” as well as that cited by Hughes as “curiously made or decorated.”
106. For a discussion of the Chorus in relation to the Hebraic law, see Joan S. Bennett,
“Liberty under the Law: The Chorus and Meaning of Samson Agonistes,” Milton Studies, ed. James
D. Simmonds, 12 (Pittsburgh, 1978).
107. Leviathan, ed. MacPherson, p. 366. The extent to which Hobbes could be turned against
himself is made evident by the full sentence: “Though he that is subject to no Civill Law, sinneth
in all he does against his Conscience, because he hath no other rule to follow but his own reason;
yet it is not so with him that lives in a Common-wealth; because the Law is the publique
Conscience, by which he hath already undertaken to be guided.”
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are all.108 Samson’s perplexed last speech in the presence of the Chorus
betrays the epistemological crisis of the world to which he’s surrendering
himself: “how the sight / Of mee as of a common Enemy, / So dreaded
once, may now exasperate them, I know not” (ll. 1415–17). Evacuating
all knowledge with all protection, Samson submits alike to total faith,
total vulnerability, and total warfare as epistemological crisis in full
bodily danger licenses the recourse to unrestrained “Conscience.”
Departed from the Chorus’ (and even the readers’) company, at the
center of the Philistine theater, Samson inhabits the paradox of the
“sovereign subject,” both radically, ineffably vulnerable and radically,
ineffably free. In bodily terms, among enemies “Without help of eye,”
Samson becomes totally subject to the Philistines’ power—not legitimate
sovereign power, but raw power, the power over life—and through that
subjection to raw power comes to a kind of sovereignty, the legitimized
power to kill (l. 1625). This is the heart of the Hobbbesian state of
nature, where “every man has a Right to every thing; even to one
anothers body.” Samson’s material power over life and death—worldly
sovereignty, that is—has to this point been only potential, yet what acti-
vates that potential should not be distinguished from the paradoxical acts
of submission to the Philistines’ power and to God’s. In spiritual terms
the bodily submission to the Philistines is a giving over of a “jurisdiction
which belongs to God,” a “Vessel trusted . . . from above.” Samson’s
total subjection to the Philistines’ raw power, which is at the same time
a claiming of sovereignty, is an act of faith, and the claim to worldly
sovereignty legitimized by physical vulnerability is an ecstatic submission
to the “rousing motions,” a “command from Heav’n” (l. 1212). This
ecstatic submission is the heart of the doctrine of grace. Grace and
self-preservation thus join in paradox: to be sovereign, Samson must be
subject; to be subject, Samson must be sovereign. For Ferguson, sover-
eign action was submission to God’s will, as can be seen in his powerful
rhetorical exhortation to active resistance, “Who acts the power he is
108. Significant in this context is the earlier Hobbes claim: “Since all covenants of obedience
are entered into for the preservation of a man’s life, if a man be content, without resistance to lay
down his life, rather than to obey the commands of an infidel, in so hard a case he hath sufficiently
discharged himself thereof. For no covenant bindeth farther than to endeavour; and if a man
cannot assure himself to perform a just duty, when thereby he is assured of present death, much
less can it be expected that a man should perform that, for which he believeth in his heart he
shall be damned eternally.” See The Elements of Law, Natural & Politic, ed. Ferdinand Tönnies
(Cambridge, Eng., 1928), p. 125.
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imbued with[?]” Samson “can” be completely vulnerable, and thus
sovereign, so he finally “will” (ll. 1320, 1342). “It is our Will-not, not our
Can not that ariseth in judgment against us,” according to Ferguson
(p. 279). Samson’s submission to God and the Philistines is ultimately a
submission to God’s “nature within [him]”—that is, to himself.
Nowhere is the paradox of the sovereign subject more evident than in
Samson’s non-suicide suicide. Thinking about that paradox will lead to
my final comments about what Milton’s reception of Hobbes may mean.
The Chorus describes Samson’s death in the passive voice, as “self-killed
/ Not willingly” (ll. 1664–65). Self-preservationist and sovereign, Samson
“will not” kill himself, only others (l. 1342). Subject to the Philistines
and God, Samson’s body may nevertheless be “dispensed” for destruction
(l. 1377). In the complex antinomies of Samson’s acts of submission and
autonomy, consent and coercion, Samson’s body is both a passive locus
of violence and an active purveyor of it. It is no doubt possible to try
to explain this paradox with recourse to doctrinal points of Milton’s
theology, but that is not my project. Rather, the unresolved contradiction
seems of greater utility in thinking about how something called the
liberal democratic “citizen” can always be “dispensed” in his or her own
name. If Milton’s recourse to the laws of self-preservation is inscribed
within his attempt to produce for dissenters a sovereign realm free from
the state’s persecution, then Samson’s submission to God and raw power
helps to produce that same sovereign’s subjectivity. If in the near term
the dissenting subject reading Samson Agonistes can look with “eyes fast
fixt” on the allure of sovereignty articulated in a theologized language of
self-preservation, in the long term he or she will come to know that that
station too involves subjection and vulnerability to the state’s violence,
only now, sanctioned, somehow, by oneself (l. 1637). That Samson can
kill himself without his consent can be seen as a final entangling of
Hobbes’s materialism and Milton’s Christian liberty, where the natural
dictate to save oneself at the expense of all others is forever subject to
nullification by God. Hence the promise and the terror of the modern
notion of “popular sovereignty,” being subject and sovereign, “below
and, at the same time, most elevated”: “in control” yet still always at the
state’s mercy.109
109. Agamben, p. 124.
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v
This essay has moved from Thomas Hobbes’s views on toleration to
dissenters’ use of Hobbes’s arguments for self-preservation and then to
Milton’s Samson Agonistes, which makes use of Hobbes’s primacy of
self-preservation in previously unacknowledged ways. Such a reception
helps to explain the liberal paradox of the “sovereign subject.” I have
adopted a view of Samson Agonistes that sees it as both written by con-
temporaneous political thought, and writing subsequent political
thought. There is more to be said about Milton’s reception of Hobbes.
Such a reception invites us to scrutinize the 1660’s as much along the axis
of Erastianism and clericalism as we have along the axis of republi-
canism and royalism. A common antipathy with Hobbes for the clergy
prompted Milton to turn to an anticlerical materialist and find further
common ground in the language of self-preservation. Such language was
ultimately put to radical religious ends that Hobbes manifestly reviled,
yet such is the nature of strange bedfellows. More work needs to be
done, therefore, on the alliances of what might be called the anti-
ecclesiastical left and the anti-ecclesiastical right to determine whether
“strange bedfellows” is even the appropriate term. Also worth remem-
bering is something that royalist Anglicans and Presbyterians may have
understood but that scholars have largely overlooked: that Hobbes was
to be feared not in spite of his strong claims regarding sovereignty
but because of them. If scholars have been reluctant to consider the role
of Hobbes’s reception in emerging Whiggism, it may be because a per-
ceived royalism has successfully protected from view those arguments
on the anti-ecclesiastical left that found purchase on the political left.
Finally, recalling Hughes’s failure to indicate Aubrey’s emendation,
Milton studies may profitably ask itself what investment it has in keeping
Hobbes and Milton in opposition.110
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